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What Role for South Coalitions in Global Governance? 
A South African View 
 
A whole bunch of new informal South coalitions came into existence in recent years, most of 
them dedicated to influencing the WTO trade negotiations. But what role do these informal 
coalitions play in global governance? Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, National Director of the South 
African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg, presents a South African view 
on the matter. South Africa as an important emerging market and Africa’s powerhouse is a key 
player in these South coalitions. At the same time it could help build bridges to the North, says 
Sidiropoulos. She was a speaker at the Development and Peace Foundation’s Summer Dialogue 
2006 on 8/9 June in Dresden, entitled “Multilateralism in Transition. Fragmentation, Infor-
malisation and Networking”. 
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“Multilateralism and more equitable global governance 
are critical for eradicating global apartheid”  
 
Ever since decolonisation, developing countries have sought greater strength on the internatio-
nal stage through the much-touted South-South solidarity. While this has acted as a useful rhe-
torical tool and opportunity for summits of non-aligned movements, its real effectiveness has 
been limited.  
The reason has been simple. Until very recently, the developing countries’ collective economic 
power was small. The rise of new powers in the developing world in the last decade therefore 
has helped the emergence of more effective informal networks and alliances in the ‘South’, 
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which are illustrative of the growing economic leverage of countries like Brazil, China and In-
dia. Their effectiveness also has much to do with their own greater capacity to study the issues 
and take informed positions on matters ranging from UN reform to complex trade negotiations. 
This in turn has allowed them to exercise positive rather than negative bargaining power: their 
inputs have focused on providing alternative options to issues rather than being only reactive 
and defensive. 
It is in this changing environment that South Africa re-entered the community of nations in 
1994. While South Africa does not have the economic and political muscle that Brazil, India and 
China have, it carries weight in international forums because of its political transformation and 
the manner in which it has taken on its responsibilities as a global citizen. Furthermore, the 
country is Africa’s economic powerhouse, producing about 40% of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP.  
South Africa’s apartheid history, where the Nationalist Party government followed a policy of 
destabilisation of the region, underlines the current government’s foreign policy approach. Very 
sensitive to being regarded as a hegemon and a bully, South Africa has favoured the multilate-
ral route to address many of the challenges it perceives face the international order. Democratic 
South Africa’s foreign policy has focused largely on four key areas.  
First, the importance of multilateralism and more equitable global governance. South Africa regards 
engagement on these two issues as critical for eradicating global apartheid, because institutions 
of global governance should serve as important vehicles for addressing poverty and underde-
velopment around the world. South Africa has been very active in the UN and its various agen-
cies, the WTO, and the Bretton Woods institutions.  
Second, building coalitions among countries of the South, both bilaterally and through informal forums. 
The objective is both to address some of the imbalances of the global system through common 
approaches, but equally to diversify trade and investment relations away from the traditional 
north-south axis. 
Third, building bridges to the North, especially with those countries that are sympathetic to the ob-
jectives of greater representivity and equity, as well as the South’s developmental imperatives. 
Such bridges provide opportunities for the development of synergies on issues with powerful 
countries who call the shots in global forums, such as the UN and the Bretton Woods institu-
tions, for example. 
Fourth, developing African solidarity on issues of global governance. South Africa’s global role can be 
undermined if it is seen to be working apart and without the support of Africa. 
In the context of the above, South Africa has been very active in pursuing coalitions among 
Southern nations. These coalitions have become even more important as agents of progress, in 
light of the stagnation in the reform of formal multilateral institutions of global governance. 
Such networks include the G3 (India-Brazil-South Africa Forum, IBSA), the G20+ (a coalition of 
developing countries within the World Trade Organisation that emerged at the Cancun Minis-
terial in 2003), the Non-Agricultural Market Access 11 (emerging at the Hong Kong Ministerial), 
and the G20 Finance to name but a few. These informal groupings are issue-based, and may 
transcend traditional North-South divides, including both developed and developing countries. 
Bridges and forums also contribute to the shaping of common perceptions and solutions to glo-
bal problems and formal structures that are accountable and transparent.  
Building South coalitions is important for South Africa on two fronts: to take up issues of global 
governance and equity with developed countries on the need to reform the architecture of glo-
bal governance; and to take up the issue of improving governance and accountability within 
African states, on the continent.  
IBSA 
The establishment of IBSA in 2003 among three key emerging powers in Latin America, Africa 
and Asia, was aimed at translating their political and economic weight in their respective re-
gions and globally, into leverage over reform of the global governance architecture, specifically 
at the time on UN reform. Thus, while IBSA has focused on functional areas of economic coope-
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ration in particular, the Forum is also about creating alliances and networks to maximise impact 
on the current geopolitical balance of power.  
Recognising the inertia of big alliances/bodies, South African president Thabo Mbeki had pro-
posed a ‘smaller, more constructive South-South forum’, while for Brazil’s President da Silva, 
the IBSA Forum was part of building an ‘axis of the developing South’. 
The alliance of these three states has been important to activities in areas, such as in the WTO, 
where the emergence of the G20+ has been successful in redefining power dynamics. The IBSA 
Forum also creates opportunity for discussion of broader global issues among the three leaders.  
There are clearly constraints to maintaining cohesion: the interpersonal dynamics among the 
three leaders are important, and leadership changes may affect this. For South Africa more spe-
cifically, the issue of ‘African solidarity’ can be an inhibiting factor, as its interests in the global 
arena may often differ from those of other African states. 
The G20+  
The G20+ in the WTO was a seminal development in the flexing of muscle by developing coun-
tries. Notwithstanding the suspension of the Doha Development Round in July 2006, it has been 
recognised that any progress will require the effective participation of a number of key devel-
oping countries. In one sense it democratises this institution as decision-making is no longer the 
preserve of the rich; on the other hand, however, it continues to disenfranchise the poor, given 
that the interests of the big developing countries are often different from theirs. The size of the 
WTO and its unwieldiness demonstrated that multi-country coalitions are important, especially 
on specific issues, as they help to forge compromises in smaller groups, which can then be taken 
up at more inclusive forums. 
The G20+ model of coalition formation could work in other areas too. At the Hong Kong Minis-
terial of the WTO in December 2005, a group of countries formed the NAMA 11, comprising Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Namibia, Philippines, South Africa, Tunisia and Vene-
zuela. The NAMA 11 has demanded the elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escala-
tion in developed countries and thus the creation of enough space to advance the industrial 
development of developing countries. 
Indeed, the success of the G20+ in creating a negotiating power bloc within the WTO that 
would have to be taken seriously by developed countries, has given greater impetus to the crea-
tion of coalitions around specific issues. South Africa’s chief trade negotiator, Xavier Carim, em-
phasised in August 2006, that the G20+ was not going to disappear. He attributed to the G20+ 
the fact that there had emerged the shape of a deal on agriculture at the WTO, notwithstanding 
the suspension of talks.  
The G8 and the G20 Finance 
South Africa recognises the important role that informal networks of the North (most notably 
the G8) play in global politics, and has chosen – in line with its approach to develop North-
South bridges – to engage with them too. South Africa (with key partners in Africa and else-
where in the developing world) regards the G8 as the locus of power that can move things more 
quickly. It was to the G8 that South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria (and later Senegal) took their 
new vision for Africa. Indeed, their presence at successive G8 summits has been key to raising 
the profile of Africa and its new governance and developmental initiatives. South Africa’s ap-
proach has been to forge alliances among like-minded states in Africa to take forward the Afri-
can vision both within the continent and to key Northern partners.  
However, there is a potential tension between South Africa’s participation in coalitions of key 
developing states of the South, presence at G8 summits, and its professed solidarity with the 
rest of Africa – at least, there is a perception in some Africa quarters that this has little meaning 
when South Africa joins elite clubs. Since the turn of the century, the G8 has invited leading 
African countries (such as South Africa, Nigeria and Senegal) and emerging economic power-
houses, such as China, India and Brazil, to their summits for a meeting. At the most recent sum-
mit in St Petersburg, the UK proposed the establishment of a G13 (to include the G8, plus 
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China, Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa). This has not received much support among 
other G8 members. However, it is a recognition that increasingly, the role of China and India in 
the global economic and financial system is such that they would have to be brought into such a 
formation. The challenge for South Africa is not necessarily to opt out, but to manage the pro-
cess of building trust among African states and being perceived as transparent in its engage-
ment and participation in such forums. 
Another informal network to emerge in the last few years is the G20 Finance, made up of both 
developed and developing states, which grew out of the recognition that maintaining global 
economic and financial stability required broadening the participation beyond the G7. The G20 
of Finance Ministers is far more representative of the world’s diverse cultures and religions, in-
dustrialised and industrialising nations, as well as populations and economies. South Africa is 
the only African state on this body. It is a body, which South Africa takes very seriously and 
which it will be chairing in 2007. The G20 Finance is a useful forum for building consensus on 
reforms in the Bretton Woods institutions for example, to which South Africa is committed. It 
believes it can play an important bridge-building role, given that it is not a consumer of these 
institutions, but is an emerging market.  
Opening up participation 
South Africa’s approach to South coalitions, but equally to participation in forums that seek to 
bridge the gap between North and South, has been very pragmatic. It has been guided by the 
realisation that while a more equitable global order (political, economic and security) is the 
long-term objective, coalitions among like-minded Southern nations keep the pressure on and 
the process moving in the direction of greater transparency and democratisation. 
Some in the South regard the emergence of such South coalitions as weakening South-South so-
lidarity. Indeed, these may have led to a fragmentation among states as well as a questioning of 
the legitimacy of ‘representatives of the South’ in such informal networks. However, this so-
called fragmentation is a positive phenomenon, which reflects the maturing of South-South pol-
itics at global level, focusing not on the rhetoric of exclusion and victimhood of the past, but 
rather on the role they can play in shaping the world at this critical juncture of transition. Not 
all states can have a stake in these networks. The inertia of big formal structures (which are 
weighed in favour of the North) make smaller clubs forged on common interests and issues ne-
cessary to keep the process moving by building consensus among sub-groups. Democratisation 
of discussions and decisions on global governance issues should not hold progress hostage by 
creating impossible expectations of complete global consensus. 
Nevertheless, informal networks are not an alternative to formal institutions; rather they are 
complementary at this juncture. South Africa believes that transparent rules-based institutions 
should be the objective of the process of a more just global governance system. In the medium 
to long run this approach has the potential to strengthen the formal institutions of multilate-
ralism.  
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